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ABSTRACT
Previous research addressing motivational effects on cognitive control adaptations
primarily manipulated external rewards. In the present study, we examined whether
achievement motivation, reflecting intrinsic motivation, modulates cognitive control
adaptations. In each of two experiments, students were divided into a high achievement
motivation group (HAM; Experiment 1: N = 36; Experiment 2: N = 39) and a low
achievement motivation group (LAM; Experiment 1: N = 30; Experiment 2: N = 39) on the
basis of the Achievement Motivation Scale. Cognitive control adaptations were assessed
by sequential congruency effects (SCEs) in Flanker tasks. Using a standard Flanker task in
Experiment 1 and examining response times, the HAM but not LAM participants showed
evidence of cognitive control adaptations. Because SCEs in a standard Flanker task may
reflect lower-level, bottom-up processes rather than cognitive control adaptations, we
used an adapted version of the Flanker task in Experiment 2 that controlled for the
potential influence of such processes. Experiment 2 again revealed evidence of SCEs in
the HAM but not LAM participants. These results suggest that cognitive control
adaptions may be modulated by achievement motivation. Such potential modulation
could be taken into account when evaluating results of previous and future
fundamental and applied studies on cognitive control adaptations.
ARTICLE HISTORY
Received 24 April 2017
Accepted 16 April 2018
KEYWORDS
Achievement motivation;
cognitive control adaptation;
flanker task; sequential
congruency effects; students
Introduction
Executive or cognitive control processes enable the
pursuit of goals in the face of continually changing
and potentially distracting environmental stimuli
(Diamond, 2013). These cognitive processes are
crucial for many behaviours that are of clinical and
societal relevance (e.g. Young et al., 2009) and are
positively associated with (developing) physical
and mental health (Diamond, 2013), such as math-
ematical and reading skills in early childhood and
social functioning (Blair & Razza, 2007; Carlson &
Moses, 2001). Reversely, compromised cognitive
control abilities have a detrimental impact on
society, being conducive to, for example, alcohol
abuse, criminal versatility, and antisocial behaviour
(e.g. Chamorro et al., 2012).
One important executive function, which is the
focus of the present study, concerns the ability to
prevent stimuli from interfering with performing
a target task, also termed interference control
(Friedman & Miyake, 2004; Nigg, 2000; Stahl et al.,
2014). Interference control is frequently studied
using the Flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974). In
this task, participants have to respond according to
some feature of a centrally-presented stimulus. On
incongruent trials, the central stimulus is surrounded
by stimuli that prompt a response that conflicts with
the response demanded by the central stimulus. On
congruent trials, flanking and central stimuli impli-
cate the same response. On incongruent, but not
congruent trials, the participant must actively sup-
press attention and behavioural responding to the
conflicting flanking stimuli, thus requiring interfer-
ence control. This difference in interference control
demand is reflected in shorter response times (RTs)
and a higher response accuracy for congruent than
incongruent trials.
Cognitive control processes in general, and inter-
ference control in particular, have been shown to be
flexibly adjustable to meet current demands. One
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type of such adjustments are moment-to-moment
cognitive adaptations as evidenced by sequential
congruency effects (SCEs; see Duthoo, Abrahamse,
Braem, Boehler, & Notebaert, 2014, for a review).
Within the framework of a Flanker task, SCEs take
the form of the difference in RT and accuracy
between congruent and incongruent trials being
smaller after an incongruent trial compared to
after a congruent trial. This effect is also known as
the Gratton effect (Gratton, Coles, & Donchin,
1992) and can reflect more rapid and accurate
responding to an incongruent trial that is preceded
by another incongruent trial (iI trial) compared to an
incongruent trial that is preceded by a congruent
trial (cI trial). Alternatively, or in addition, it may
reflect faster and more accurate responding to a
congruent trial that is preceded by another congru-
ent trial (cC trial) compared to a congruent trial that
follows an incongruent trial (iC trial).
In principle, SCEs can be explained in a number of
different ways that may or may not assume top-
down, cognitive control adaptation (e.g. Egner,
2007). A first explanation is the conflict-monitoring
account (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen,
2001). On this view, participants continuously
monitor the stream of information for conflict.
Upon detecting a conflict, such as on an incongruent
trial in a Flanker task, interference control processes
are up-regulated implicating enhancement of selec-
tive attention to the relevant central stimulus.
Instead, after non-conflict (congruent) trials atten-
tion is widened (down-regulated control) to
include non-target but congruent flanking stimuli.
Attending the non-target stimuli may be beneficial
for responding to the target stimulus in this case
because all stimuli implicate the same response.
These adaptations are assumed to be based on a
reactive, relatively short-lived and automatic
process (Egner & Hirsch, 2005). However, a second
approach is the so-called repetition-expectancy
account that was put forward by Gratton et al.
(1992). Participants are assumed to have a general
expectation that two successive trials will be of the
same type (congruent or incongruent), even
though this might objectively not be true. After an
incongruent trial, the participant’s attention is nar-
rowed to the central stimulus in anticipation of the
next (incongruent) trial. Reversely, attention is
widened after a congruent stimulus in anticipation
of the next (congruent) trial. This type of adaptation
is assumed to reflect a proactive process that takes
more time to develop, requires more persistence,
and is more strategic than is the case for the adjust-
ment according to the conflict-monitoring account
(Duthoo et al., 2014).
Each of the two preceding explanations assumes
a top-down, cognitive control adaptation. However,
the feature-integration or feature-priming account
(e.g. Hommel, 2004; Mayr, Awh, & Laurey, 2003)
explains SCEs in terms of more basic, bottom-up
processes that are induced by a confound implied
in a standard Flanker task. Specifically, cC and iI
trial pairs implicate an exact repetition of flanker
and central stimuli and responses, or a full alterna-
tion of these stimuli and responses. Instead, cI and
iC trials implicate a partial repetition of stimuli
(either flankers or central stimulus) and responses.
As partial repetitions result in slower responses
than exact repetitions and full alternations
(Hommel, Proctor, & Vu, 2004), the classic SCEs as
implied in the Gratton effect could, in principle, be
explained by low-level, feature-based processes.
Cognitive control and cognitive control adap-
tation effects have been found to be enhanced by
motivational manipulations consisting of introdu-
cing primary or secondary external rewards in
most but not all studies (e.g. see Braem, Verguts,
Roggeman, & Notebaert, 2012; Chiew & Braver,
2014, 2016; Soutschek, Stelzel, Paschke, Walter, &
Schubert, 2015, for supporting evidence, and van
Steenbergen, Band, & Hommel, 2009, for evidence
of impaired cognitive control induced by reward).
Evidence of negative effects of reward on cognitive
control adaptation has been suggested to reflect the
affective value of rewards (van Steenbergen et al.,
2009). Accordingly, a conflict (incongruent) trial trig-
gers a negative emotion (e.g. Dreisbach & Fischer,
2012a), which in turn motivates enhanced cognitive
effort, but a reward may counteract this motive by
inducing a positive emotional state. However, moti-
vational influences induced by external rewards and
emotional influences on cognitive control may
reflect independent mechanisms (Chiew & Braver,
2011; Dreisbach & Fischer, 2012b). Moreover, indi-
vidual differences in the motivating effects of exter-
nal reward may be an additional factor modulating
the effect of reward on cognitive control (Braem
et al., 2012), but much more research on the topic
is needed.
The purpose of the present two experiments was
to further examine motivational and emotional influ-
ences on cognitive control adaptations. In general,
research on such influences is important given the
already noted large impact of cognitive control
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abilities on healthy functioning in many domains of
daily life (e.g. Diamond, 2013). Variables that may
modulate the flexible use of such abilities may be
informative for developing tools to encourage a
more efficient use of cognitive control resources.
However, rather than examining external motiva-
tional variables, and possible corresponding
emotional effects that were primarily examined in
previous research, we focussed on an internal moti-
vational variable in the present study. Specifically,
we examined the effect of individual differences in
achievement motivation on cognitive control adap-
tations as measured in a Flanker task.
Achievement motivation is a concept from per-
sonality psychology and refers to the extent to
which an individual enjoys performing challenging
cognitive tasks. This enjoyment is associated with
the capacity to anticipate positive affects while per-
forming such tasks (e.g. Nygård & Gjesme, 1973).
Individuals with a high achievement motive base
their self-regard on successfully employing and
advancing their skills (Atkinson, 1964). These fea-
tures implicate a strong intrinsic motivation to
perform cognitively challenging tasks and to show
a strong task engagement. This motivation could
be linked to emotional consequences that in turn
could affect cognitive control adaptation in a
number of different ways. For example, following
the conflict-monitoring account, the positive
emotional state that individuals with a high achieve-
ment motivation (HAM) anticipate and experience
when performing a conflict task may counteract
the negative emotions elicited by incongruent
trials, thereby reducing the felt need to initiate cog-
nitive adjustments (e.g. see Schuch, Zweeings,
Hirsch, & Koch, 2017; van Steenbergen et al., 2009,
2010). On that view, HAM individuals will show
weaker SCEs compared to low-achievement (LAM)
participants. The opposite prediction, that HAM par-
ticipants display stronger SCEs compared to LAM
participants, could be derived from previous
research suggesting that cognitive control adap-
tations are based on the positive emotion associated
with successfully resolving a conflict trial rather than
the negative feeling associated with encountering a
conflict (e.g. Braem et al., 2012; Schouppe et al.,
2015). Specifically, resolving a conflict trial may be
intrinsically rewarding and temporarily enhance
the participant’s motivation. Assuming that this
intrinsic reward is larger for HAM than LAM partici-
pants, one may expect the former participants to
display larger SCEs than the latter. After an
incongruent trial and compared to LAM participants,
HAM participants will experience a stronger motiv-
ation to repeat the cognitive process of enhanced
selective attention that was used on that trial. This
enhanced selective attention is conducive to fast
correct responding on a subsequent incongruent
trial. However, relative to after a congruent trial,
which, if anything, is associated with adopting a
broader attentional window, the enhanced selective
attention is suboptimal for fast correct responding
on a subsequent congruent trial.
Experiment 1
In the first experiment, we assessed the achieve-
ment motivation in a large group of students.
From this group we selected subgroups of partici-
pants with the highest and lowest achievement
motivation scores. All participants then performed
a standard Flanker task to assess SCEs.
Method
Participants
The participants were 133 students from Northwest
Normal University. They all filled in the Achievement
Motivation Scale (AMS; see below). The AMS score
was used for selecting and grouping participants
into a high achievement motivation group (HAM;
∼ top 27% of the AMS scores) and a low achieve-
ment motivation group (LAM; ∼ bottom 27% of
the AMS scores). Five students from the LAM
group did not complete the Flanker task. The stu-
dents in the HAM group (n = 36; 17 men; 19
women) had a mean AMS score of M = 16.75 (SD =
7.77; range: 8−33) and a mean age of M = 21.25
(SD = 2.41). The corresponding values for the stu-
dents in the LAM group (n = 30; 9 men; 21 women)
were M = 1.63 (SD = 5.24; range: −11−7) and M =
20.50 (SD = 1.93). The two groups differed signifi-
cantly in AMS score, F(1, 64) = 82.25, p < 0.001,
h2p = 0.56, but not in age, F(1, 64) = 1.90, p = 0.17,
h2p = 0.03. When we compare these mean AMS
scores to those obtained from previous studies
(e.g. Hagtvet & Zuo, 2000; Man, Nygård, & Gjesme,
1994, implicating a mean AMS score across studies
in the range of: 8−20), the present AMS scores
suggest that especially the LAM group showed a
marked low achievement motivation, rather than
that the HAM participants presented with a particu-
larly high achievement motivation. All participants
were right-handed and had a normal or corrected-
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to-normal visual acuity. The experiment was
approved by the university ethics committee. The
students participated voluntarily and signed an
informed consent form. All participants received a
small remuneration consisting of a notebook or
pen after task completion.
AMS
We employed a Chinese version (Ye & Hagtvet, 1992)
of the AMS (Gjesme & Nygård, 1970) to measure
achievement motivation. The capacity to anticipate
positive affects in achievement situations is assessed
with 15 items (Ms items). Fifteen other items assess
the capacity to anticipate negative affects in these
situations (Mf items). Each item is answered on a 4-
point Likert scale, ranging from 1 = completely dis-
agree to 4 = completely agree. The total AMS score
was computed by subtracting the total score on
the Mf items from the total score on the Ms items,
with a higher score reflecting a stronger achieve-
ment motivation. The coefficient of internal consist-
ency was close to acceptable (Cronbach’s α = 0.68).
Flanker task
The Flanker task was programmed in Eprime and
commenced with a 500-ms presentation of a small
fixation cross, presented in the centre of the
screen against a grey background. The fixation
cross was followed by an empty grey screen that
was presented for a random duration between 300
and 500 ms. Subsequently, one of four different
strings of letters was displayed for a maximum dur-
ation of 1500 ms or until a response was made
(whichever came first), followed by a 1000-ms
empty grey screen. The next trial started immedi-
ately thereafter. The letter string either consisted
of the letters HHHHH or KKKKK (congruent trials)
or the letters HHKHH or KKHKK (incongruent trials).
The participant was required to respond according
to the identity of the middle letter of the string.
Using a standard keyboard, the participant had to
press “1” with the index finger of the left hand in
case of the letter H, and “0” with the index finger
of the right hand in case of the letter K. The partici-
pant was asked to respond as quickly and accurately
as possible and first completed one or more 16-trial
practice blocks, each consisting of eight quasi-ran-
domly intermixed congruent and incongruent
trials, until correctly responding on at least 85% of
the trials. The actual task was initiated immediately
thereafter. The main task consisted of four 33-trial
blocks. The trials were quasi-randomly presented
(for each participant the same sequence) in such a
way that, across the task (= 128 trial pairs), there
were 32 trials of each of the cC, cI, iC, and iI trial
pairs. The participant could have a short break
between each trial block and the task lasted approxi-
mately 15 min.
Procedure
All initial 133 students first filled in the AMS. The stu-
dents that were selected from this larger pool based
on their relatively high or low AMS score performed
the Flanker task 3−4 days after completion of the
AMS. Both the questionnaire and the task were com-
pleted in a quiet laboratory room. The Flanker task
was performed in small groups of 4−5 students
and each student had a separate computer to do
the task.
Data analysis
The mean RT, based on correct trials and RTs >
100 ms, and proportion of trials with a correct
response obtained from the Flanker task were
each subjected to a repeated measures analysis of
variance (RM-ANOVA), with Group (HAM vs. LAM)
as between-subject factor, and Trial n-1 congruency
(congruent vs. incongruent trials) and Trial n con-
gruency (congruent vs. incongruent) as within-
subject factors. Significant interactions were fol-
lowed-up by simple main- or interaction-effect ana-
lyses. Because of the unequal distribution of male
and female participants in the two groups, we also
performed the RM-ANOVAs with gender as covari-
ate; these analyses yielded the same pattern of
results as those described below and will not be
reported. Moreover, additional analyses using pro-
portional and log-transformed RTs (to control for
possible effects of overall differences in response
speed between the two groups) revealed the same
pattern of results as those reported below based
on the uncorrected RTs. A p value of < 0.05 was
adopted as criterion for statistical significance in all
analyses; effect sizes were expressed as partial eta-
squared. Next to these null hypothesis significance
testing (NHST) analyses, we performed Bayesian
tests using JASP (Computer software; Version
0.8.1.1) to quantify the strength of the evidence for
the alternative compared to the null hypothesis in
terms of the Bayes Factor (BF; see Jeffreys, 1961),
with BF10 > 100 indicating decisive, BF10 between
30 and 100 very strong, BF10 between 10 and 30
strong, BF10 between 3 and 10 substantial, and
BF10 between 1 and 3 anecdotal evidence in
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favour of the alternative hypothesis, respectively. A
BF10 between 0.33 and 1 indicates anecdotal, and
BF10 between 0.10 and 0.33 substantial evidence in
support of the null hypothesis. In these analyses
with default prior scales, we contrasted the alterna-
tive model consisting of the interaction term or main
effect of critical interest against the null model con-
sisting of the (remaining) main, interaction, or no
effects. We took the data as evidence for the alterna-
tive model if both the NHST revealed a significant
effect, and the BF10 suggested at least substantial
evidence for the model. Finally, we performed corre-
lation analyses to test the association between
achievement motivation and SCEs. For this
purpose we expressed SCEs magnitude using the
RT data (which gave the clearest results in this and
the following experiment; see below) in terms of
the difference between percentage congruency
effects after congruent and after incongruent trials:
[((cI-cC)/cC)-((iI-iC)/iC)]*100 (e.g. see also Ambrosi,
Lemaire, & Blaye, 2016); the larger the value on
this measure, the stronger the SCEs). To further
differentiate between the two possible sources of
SCEs, we also computed the cI-iI and iC-cC difference
scores. For each of these differences scores, a high
score reflects a strong adaptation effect. Next, we
computed the non-parametric correlation (Spear-
man’s rho) between the score on the AMS and
each of the three measures of adaptation.
Results
RTs
The left panel of Figure 1 displays the groups’ mean
RT for the different trial pairs. The figure suggests
that the HAM participants showed stronger SCEs
than the LAM students.
ANOVA revealed a significant Trial n congruency
effect, F(1, 64) = 85.83, p < 0.001, h2p = 0.57, BF10 =
4.87e + 11 (null model including Group, Trial n-1
congruency, and their interaction), and a Trial n-1
congruency × Trial n congruency effect, F(1, 64) =
14.13, p < 0.001, h2p = 0.18, BF10 = 796.21 (null
model including Group, and Trial n-1 congruency,
Trial n congruency and their interaction with
Group). Of primary importance, the Group × Trial n-
1 congruency × Trial n congruency interaction was
also significant, F(1, 64) = 8.27, p = 0.005, h2p = 0.11,
BF10 = 25.9. A separate Trial n-1 congruency × Trial
n congruency ANOVA on the data from the HAM
participants revealed a significant Trial n-1 con-
gruency × Trial n congruency interaction, F(1, 35) =
16.26, p < 0.001, h2p = 0.32, BF10 = 10489.5, reflect-
ing a weaker congruency effect after a previous
incongruent trial (iC vs. iI, p = 0.76, BF10 = 0.3) than
after a previous congruent trial (cC vs. cI, F(1, 35) =
59.85, p < 0.001, h2p = 0.63, BF10 = 1.3e + 6). This
differential congruency effect was due to both cC
trials evoking faster responding than iC trials, F(1,
35) = 12.16, p = 0.001, h2p = 0.26, BF10 = 22.8, and iI
evoking faster responding than cI trials, F(1, 35) =
11.00, p = 0.002, h2p = 0.24, BF10 = 14.9. For the
LAM participants, the Trial n-1 congruency × Trial n
congruency ANOVA only revealed a significant
effect for Trial n congruency, F(1, 29) = 39.89, p <
0.001, h2p = 0.58, BF10 = 6.7e + 7, reflecting faster
responding on current congruent than incongruent
trials, regardless of the congruency of the preceding
trial, F(1, 29) < 1, p = 0.36, h2p = 0.03, BF10 = 0.32, for
the Trial n × Trial n-1 interaction. The significant
Group × Trial n-1 congruency × Trial n congruency
interaction was also examined by analysing the
effect of Group for each of the trial-pair types.
These analyses revealed (marginally) significantly
faster responding for the HAM than LAM partici-
pants on cC and iI trial pairs, Fs(1, 64) > 3.89, ps <
0.054, h2ps . 0.05, BFs10 > 1.2, but not on cI and iC
trial pairs, ps > 0.25, BFs10 < 0.4.
Response accuracy
The right panel of Figure 1 shows the mean pro-
portion of trials with a correct response for each of
the trial-pair types and groups. ANOVA only revealed
a significant main effect of Trial n congruency, F(1,
64) = 13.43, p = 0.001, h2p = 0.17, BF10 = 215.5 (BF
against null model including Group, Trial n-1 con-
gruency, and Group × Trial n-1 congruency effects)
reflecting an overall larger accuracy for current con-
gruent compared to incongruent trials, and a signifi-
cant Trial n-1 congruency × Trial n congruency
interaction, F(1, 64) = 18.79, p < 0.001, h2p = 0.23,
BF10 = 99.6 (BF against null model containing all
effects except the target and Group × Trial n-1 con-
gruency × Trial n congruency interaction effects)
(other ps > 0.22; F < 1, p = 0.33, h2p = 0.23, BF10 =
0.4, for the most critical three-way interaction). The
interaction reflected a smaller congruency effect
for trials preceded by an incongruent trial (iC vs. iI,
p = 0.75, BF10 = 0.2) than for trials preceded by a con-
gruent trial (cC vs. cI, F(1, 65) = 23.88, p < 0.001,
h2p = 0.27, BF10 = 5466.4). This differential con-
gruency effect was due to both cC trials evoking
more accurate responses than iC trials, F(1, 65) =
10.70, p = 0.002, h2p = 0.14, BF10 = 18.0 and iI trials
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evoking more accurate responses than cI trials, F(1,
65) = 6.67, p = 0.01, h2p = 0.09, BF10 = 3.4.
Correlation analyses
Spearman’s rho was significant for the association
between the AMS score and SCE magnitude (ρ
= .28, p = .02), and near significant for that
between the AMS and cI-iI difference scores (ρ
= .24, p = .056). The association between the AMS
and iC-cC difference scores was not significant (ρ
= .15, p = .24; see Supplementary Material Figure 1
for scatterplots).
Discussion
The present experiment revealed that, when exam-
ining RTs in a standard Flanker task, participants
with a relatively high achievement motivation
showed clear evidence of SCEs, whereas those
with a relatively low achievement motivation did
not. Both achievement motivation groups showed
clear SCEs when considering the performance accu-
racy data. In terms of correlations, we found an
association between the score on the achievement
motivation questionnaire and RT-based SCE magni-
tude, which was primarily based on the association
with the cI versus iI trial type performance contrast.
The facts that group differences in the association
between achievement motivation and SCEs was sig-
nificant when examining RTs but not accuracy, are in
line with other studies showing that, at least in
Flanker tasks, critical differences may emerge
when analysing RT but not accuracy data (e.g.
Lamers & Roelofs, 2011; Schuch et al., 2017; van
Steenbergen, Band, & Hommel, 2010). In the
present study, both groups displayed SCEs when
analysing the accuracy data for the different trial
types. However, the RTs suggest that the LAM par-
ticipants needed more time to reach this similar
pattern of accuracy rates for the different trial pair
types than the HAM participants did. This was
most strongly the case for the cC and iI trials pairs.
These two trial pairs are most critically involved in
producing the Gratton effect: widening attention
(i.e. including flankers) to facilitate responding on
cC trials, and narrowing attention (i.e. blending out
distracting flankers) on iI trials.
Whether the group difference in SCEs for the RT
data implicates a difference in cognitive control
adaptation depends on how to interpret SCEs from
interference-control tasks in general. As outlined in
the introduction, following the feature-integration
or feature-priming account, SCEs in a standard
Flanker task may be entirely explained in terms of
low-level, bottom-up processes based on differential
priming effects associated with full versus partial
stimulus repetitions or alternations. Therefore, in
Experiment 2 we again assessed the effect of
achievement motivation on SCEs in a Flanker tasks,
but now while eliminating the potential influence
of these low-level processes.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, we adopted a version of the Flanker
task that controls for repetition confounds inherent
to traditional 4-stimuli/2-response Flanker tasks,
while at the same time avoiding contingency
biases that may be introduced when using an
unequal number of congruent and incongruent
trials (Duthoo et al., 2014). Specifically, we adapted
the Flanker task with coloured circle stimuli used
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Figure 1. Mean (±SEM) RT (left) and proportion of trials with a correct response (right) for the different trial pairs in Exper-
iment 1 that were defined by the congruency (con = congruent; incon = incongruent) of the current (Trial n) and preceding
(Trial n-1) trial, separately for participants with a high achievement motivation (HAM) and a low achievement motivation
(LAM).
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by Kim and Cho (2014) to a letter Flanker task similar
to that in Experiment 1. The question of interest was
whether, using this task, we could replicate the main
result of Experiment 1 of differential SCEs as a func-
tion of achievement motivation.
Method
Participants
The participants were 143 healthy undergraduate
university students from Northwest Normal Univer-
sity. All students first finished the AMS, as in Exper-
iment 1. From this large group, we selected 27% of
the participants with the highest and lowest AMS
scores as the HAM and LAM groups, respectively.
The HAM group (n = 39; 14 men; age: M = 21.21
years, SD = 1.79) had a mean AMS score of M =
7.18 (SD = 5.11; range: 2−26); the LAM group (n =
39; 14 men; age: M = 20.72 years, SD = 1.64) had a
mean AMS score of M =−6.92 (SD = 8.03; range:
−37−0). The difference in AMS score was highly sig-
nificant, F(1, 76) = 85.57.85, p < 0.001, h2p = 0.53.
Although the mean AMS score for both the HAM
and LAM groups was lower than that for the corre-
sponding groups in Experiment 1, the absolute
difference in AMS score between the HAM and
LAM groups was similar in both experiments (Exper-
iment 1: 15.12; Experiment 2: 14.10) and a Group ×
Experiment ANOVA on the AMS score did not
reveal a significant interaction effect, F < 1. More-
over, selecting only participants from the present
experiment that were matched by a participant
from Experiment 1 with an identical AMS score,
while applying the same criterion for group mem-
bership as in Experiment 1, resulted in the same
pattern of results as those reported below. These
findings suggest that any differences in results
between the two experiments were due to task
differences rather than to differences in AMS
scores. All participants were right-handed and had
a normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity. The
experiment was approved by the Northwest
Normal University Ethics Committee.
AMS
The AMS was as described in Experiment 1.
Flanker task
The Flanker task was as described in Experiment 1
except for the following. Next to the four trial types
involving the letters H and K (Set 1), we used an
additional set of four trial types (Set 2) using the
letters D and U (congruent: DDDDD and UUUUU;
incongruent: DDUDD and UUDUU). Stimuli from Set
1 were consistently presented on even trials; those
from Set 2 on even trials (strict alternating presen-
tation). Each of the 8 possible trial-pair (transition)
types that constituted cC trials (i.e. with arrow repre-
senting “is followed by”, HHHHH→DDDDD,
DDDDD→KKKKK, UUUUU→HHHHH, etc.) was pre-
sented an equal number of times within each block
of trials. The same was true for cI (i.e.
DDDDD→KKHKK, KKKKK→UUDUU, KKKKK→DDUDD,
etc.), iC (i.e. DDUDD→KKKKK, HHKHH→DDDDD,
KKHKK→UUUUU, etc.), and iI trial pairs (i.e. KKHKK
→DDUDD, UUDUU→HHKHH, DDUDD→KKHKK, etc.).
The main test was initiated after a practice block of
16 trials (8 congruent and 8 incongruent trials, 8
trials from each of Sets 1 and 2), which was repeated
until the participant responded correctly on at least
85% of the trials. The main task consisted of four
blocks of 33 trials each. Within each block, the first
trial was not used for analysis and the remaining 32
trials were quasi-randomly selected. For each partici-
pant we used the same quasi-random order so as to
ensure that all trial types (letter combinations) and
trial-pair types (cC, iC, cI, and iI) were presented
equally often, and the same trial-pair type was not
presented more than two times in a row. Most impor-
tantly, the strict alternating presentation ensured a
complete control of feature repetitions: none of the
letters, neither flanker nor target, occurring on trial
n-1 was repeated on trial n. Moreover, none of the
flanker or target stimuli was predictive of the nature
of the target stimulus on the subsequent trial. As in
Experiment 1, each trial started with a 500-ms presen-
tation of a fixation cross, which was followed by an
empty screen for a variable duration between 300
and 500 ms.
Thereafter, one of eight possible letter strings
was shown for a maximum of 1500 ms or until a
response was made, whichever came first. Finally,
an empty screen was presented for 1000 ms. Par-
ticipants were instructed to press the “G”, “H”,
“J”, and “K” key on a standard keyboard using
the fingers of their dominant hand if the middle
(target) letter was H, K, D, and U, respectively.
Each of the keys was covered by a sticker display-
ing the corresponding target letter. The task lasted
about 15 min.
Procedure and data analysis
The procedure and data analysis were as described
for Experiment 1.
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Results and discussion
Figure 2 shows the mean RT and response accuracy
associated with each of the different types of trial
pair for the HAM and LAM groups.
RTs
A Group × Trial n-1 congruency × Trial n congruency
ANOVA using the RT data revealed significant effects
of Trial n congruency, F(1, 76) = 93.23, p < 0.001,
h2p = 0.55, BF10 = 7.36e + 17, the Trial n-1 con-
gruency × Trial n congruency interaction, F(1, 76) =
40.73, p < 0.001, h2p = 0.35, BF10 = 365.75, and the
Group × Trial n-1 congruency × Trial n congruency
interaction, F(1, 76) = 26.68, p < 0.001, h2p = 0.26,
BF10 = 54.15 (other ps > 0.10). The latter interaction
motivated an ANOVA for each group separately.
For the HAM group, this analysis revealed a signifi-
cant interaction effect, F(1, 38) = 87.73, p < 0.001,
h2p = 0.70, BF10 = 285782.93 (null model only includ-
ing main effects), next to a main effect of Trial n con-
gruency, F(1, 38) = 62.44, p < 0.001, h2p = 0.62, BF10
= 2.71e + 11. The interaction reflected a smaller con-
gruency effect after an incongruent trial (RT differ-
ence between iI and iC: mean = 19.13, SD = 36.94)
than after a congruent trial (cI minus cC: mean =
76.18, SD = 46.85). This differential congruency
effect reflected faster responding on cC than iC
trials, F(1, 38) = 48.73, p < 0.001, h2p = 0.56, BF10 =
291406.05, and on iI than cI trials, F(1, 38) = 12.92, p
< 0.001, h2p = 0.25, BF10 = 30.52. The Trial n-1 con-
gruency × Trial n congruency ANOVA using the data
from the LAM group only revealed a main Trial n con-
gruency effect, F(1, 38) = 32.80, p < 0.001, h2p = 0.46,
BF10 = 8290.44, reflecting faster responding on
current congruent than incongruent trials regardless
of the congruency of the previous trial, F(1, 38) < 1,
p = 0.45, BF10 = 0.26, for the Trial n-1 congruency ×
Trial n congruency interaction. The significant
Group × Trial n-1 congruency × Trial n congruency
interaction was also examined by analysing the
effect of Group for each of the trial-pair types.
These analyses only revealed significantly faster
responding for the HAM than LAM participants on
cC trial pairs, Fs(1, 76) = 5.42 p = 0.02, h2ps = 0.07,
although Bayesian analysis only revealed anecdotal
evidence for this difference, BF10 = 2.36. The group
difference was not significant for each of the other
trial-pair types, ps > 0.12, BFs10 < 0.70.
Response accuracy
ANOVA using the accuracy data revealed a
main effect of Trial n congruency, F(1, 76) = 10.16,
p = 0.002, h2p = 0.12, BF10 = 70.57, which reflected
an overall higher accuracy on current congruent
(mean = 0.91) than incongruent (mean = 0.89) trials.
The Group × Trial n-1 congruency × Trial n con-
gruency interaction was also significant, F(1, 76) =
5.48, p = 0.02, h2p = 0.07, but the evidence for a
model containing the interaction term against a
null model with only the main effects was only anec-
dotal, BF10 = 1.57. A subsequent Trial n-1 con-
gruency × Trial n congruency ANOVA using the
data from the HAM group also only revealed very
strong evidence for an effect of Trial n congruency,
F(1, 38) = 8.40, p = 0.006, h2p = 0.18, BF10 = 86.77,
whereas the evidence for a Trial n-1 congruency ×
Trial n congruency interaction was again anecdotal,
F(1, 38) = 6.81, p = 0.01, h2p = 0.15, BF10 = 1.46. For
the LAM group, the corresponding ANOVA failed
to reveal any significant effects, ps > .13, maximum
BF10 = .55.
Despite the lack of convincing evidence of differ-
ential SCEs in the two groups when considering the
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Figure 2. Mean (±SEM) RT (left) and proportion of trials with a correct response (right) for the different trial pairs in Exper-
iment 2 that were defined by the congruency (con = congruent; incon = incongruent) of the current (Trial n) and preceding
(Trial n-1) trial, separately for participants with a high achievement motivation (HAM) and a low achievement motivation
(LAM).
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accuracy data, we assessed whether the larger SCEs
for the HAM than LAM participants when looking at
the RT data were significantly affected by a speed-
accuracy trade-off. First, we assessed whether
there were any signs of such trade off to begin
with by computing Spearman’s correlations
between mean RT and accuracy for each of the
trial pair types. If anything, these analyses revealed
negative (but non-significant) correlations (higher
RTs [slower responses] meaning lower accuracy; ρ
=−0.09, p = 0.46 for cC, ρ = 0.01, p = 0.94 for iC, ρ
=−0.19, p = 0.09 for cI, and ρ =−0.18, p = 0.11 for
iI), suggesting no speed-accuracy trade off. Second,
we tested whether the critical Group × Trial n-1 con-
gruency × Trial n congruency interaction for the RT
data (reflecting stronger SCEs in the HAM than
LAM group) was still significant when controlling
for accuracy on the different trial types. A Group ×
Trial n-1 congruency × Trial n congruency analysis
of covariance, with the mean accuracy on cC, cI, iC,
and iI trial types as covariates still revealed very
strong evidence for a three-way interaction effect,
F(1, 72) = 25.93, p < 0.001, h2p = 0.27, BF10 = 48.21.
The interaction again reflected faster responding
on cC than iC trials for the HAM, F(1, 34) = 4.94, p
= .03, h2p = 0.13, BF10 = 344747.61, but not the
LAM participants, F < 1, p = 0.38, BF10 = 0.38. Like-
wise, responding was faster on iI than cI trials for
the HAM, F(1, 34) = 8.58, p = .006, h2p = 0.20, BF10 =
30.08, but not LAM students, F < 1, p = 0.77, BF10 =
0.26. These results suggest that the interpretation
of stronger SCEs for the HAM compared to LAM
group derived from the RT analyses was not com-
promised by the pattern of responding seen for
the accuracy data.
Correlation analyses
Spearman’s rho was significant for the association
between AMS score and RT-based SCE magnitude
(ρ = .58, p < .001). The association between the
AMS and cI-iI difference score just failed to be signifi-
cant (ρ = .21, p = .06), whereas the association
between the AMS and the iC-cC difference score
was significant (ρ = .34, p = .002; see Supplementary
Material Figure 1 for the corresponding scatterplots).
In this experiment we used a Flanker task that
controlled for lower-level processes that potentially
could have affected the SCEs in Experiment 1. As
in Experiment 1, for the RT but not accuracy data,
we again found reliable evidence for SCEs in the
HAM but not LAM participants. Moreover, if any-
thing the correlation analyses revealed an even
stronger association between the AMS score and
magnitude of (components of) SCEs than was the
case in Experiment 1.
General discussion
The present two experiments provide evidence that
the extent to which students flexibly adapt cognitive
control processes, specifically those implied in inter-
ference control, is dependent on their achievement
motivation. This evidence was found in Experiment
1 in the form of differential standard SCEs in a stan-
dard Flanker task. In Experiment 2, we again used a
Flanker task but removed potential confounds by
lower processes that are not dependent on cogni-
tive control. We again found evidence for differential
moment-to-moment adaptation effects that were
dependent on achievement motivation. In both
experiments, these adaptations took the form of
faster responding to a congruent trial when that
trial was preceded by a congruent rather than incon-
gruent trial, and by faster responding to an incon-
gruent trial when that trial had been preceded by
an incongruent rather than congruent trial. The posi-
tive association between achievement motivation
and SCEs was further supported by correlation
analyses.
In the introduction we outlined three different
accounts of SCEs, the conflict-monitoring, repetition-
expectancy, and feature integration accounts.
Research suggests that each of the processes
described by these accounts may independently
contribute to performance in a given conflict task
(e.g. Scherbaum, Frisch, Dshemuchadse, Rudolf, &
Fischer, 2016) but that the extent to which they
are involved may be dependent on specific task par-
ameters, such as number of feature repetitions and
inter-stimulus interval (ITI) or response-to-stimulus
interval (RSI; Duthoo et al., 2014). For Experiment 1,
we cannot exclude that the standard SCEs found
for the HAM group were not partly or even fully
due to feature integration or feature-priming effects.
However, if such lower-order processes were
responsible, it remains to be explained why and
how different levels of achievement motivation
should affect such processes rather than the adap-
tation of cognitive control. The task in Experiment
2 removed possible influences of lower-order,
bottom-up processes. The achievement-motiv-
ation-based differential SCEs found in this exper-
iment suggest a difference in the use of some
cognitive control adaptation process, either of the
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reactive type (conflict-monitoring account) or proac-
tive type (repetition-expectancy account).
One possible explanation of the effect of achieve-
ment motivation could be that the present SCEs for
the HAM participants were based on the proactive,
expectancy-driven process. Accordingly, the HAM
participants put more effort into the task than the
LAM participants did in terms of more voluntarily
and strategically employing expectancy-based
control processes. However, in general, expect-
ancy-based adaptations are held to be primarily
involved if expectancies concerning the repetition
of congruent and incongruent trials are relatively
strong, for example by providing explicit cues that
inform the participant about the probability of
such sequences (Duthoo et al., 2014). The exper-
imental design in both experiments implicated
equal probabilities of stimulus type repetition and
alternation and, therefore, was not conducive to
the establishment of strong expectations. Moreover,
although the RSI in the present tasks was relatively
long (between 1500 and 2000 ms), which might
speak to the involvement of the more prolonged
expectancy-based processes, this interval is still
within the range at which the relatively more
short-lived retroactive processes have been shown
to be effective (e.g. Egner, Ely, & Grinband, 2010).
An alternative mechanism underlying the
enhanced cognitive adaptation seen in the HAM
individuals may be based on effects that emotions
in general have on cognitive control, and adap-
tations thereof (Chiew & Braver, 2011). By definition
HAM, but not LAM, individuals anticipate and experi-
ence a positive emotion when performing cognitive
tasks. Induction of a positive affect has been
suggested to improve cognitive flexibility (e.g. Isen,
Daubman, & Nowicki, 1987), which in turn might
be linked to increased dopamine release, affecting
brain areas that are critical for cognitive control
(e.g. Ashby, Isen, & Turken, 1999). Accordingly,
because of their more positive affective state, HAM
participants display more flexible cognitive control
in the form of SCEs than the LAM participants.
However, this line of reasoning would be more in
line with a proactive rather than reactive account
of the present cognitive control adaptations. This is
because, if anything, a positive emotion would coun-
teract any negative feelings induced by conflict
(incongruent) trials and thereby decreasing the ten-
dency to adapt attentional processes, as assumed
to take place in the framework of the conflict-moni-
toring account (see van Steenbergen et al., 2009,
2010). Hence, if we dismiss a strong involvement
of proactive processes based on the arguments out-
lined above, we have to look for yet an alternative
explanation of the present achievement motivation
effects.
A third explanation focusses on motivational
rather than (potential) affective effects of a high or
low achievement motivation. As outlined in the
introduction, there is evidence that resolving a con-
flict trial may be intrinsically rewarding and can tem-
porarily enhance the participant’s motivation (Braem
et al., 2012; Schouppe et al., 2015). If this motivating
effect is stronger for HAM than LAM participants, it
could be assumed that, after having solved an incon-
gruent trial, the former participants experience a
much stronger motivation to repeat the cognitive
process that had just been used, be that in the
form of a modulation of selective attention or
some effort-related process. Note that this line of
reasoning assumes that these motivational effects
occur very rapidly and automatically, similar as is
assumed within the context of the conflict-monitor-
ing account. However, clearly more research is
needed to test these assumptions, for example in
research that systematically combines intrinsic and
extrinsic motivational and affective manipulations.
In principle, SCEs differences based on achieve-
ment motivation might result from, or be mediated
by, potential differences in executive functions or
general IQ rather than from or by differences in
achievement motivation (but see Keye, Wilhelm,
Oberauer, & Van Ravenzwaaij, 2009). For example,
a high achievement motivation might be the result
of repeatedly having been successful in solving cog-
nitive tasks in general, which in turn is positively
associated with cognitive capacities. However, in
both studies we used participants that were ran-
domly sampled from one pool of university students
and the two groups performed equally well on the
tasks in terms of overall response accuracy. More-
over, in an unpublished study we assessed non-
verbal fluid IQ using Raven’s Advanced Progressive
Matrices Test (RAPM; Raven, Court, & Raven, 1977)
in two selected groups (out of a 175 students, also
from Northwest Normal University) with a high
(HAM: 17.02) and low (LAM: −.5.5) AMS score. If any-
thing, these two groups had even more extreme
AMS scores than the students in the present Exper-
iments 1 and 2 did, but they did not significantly
differ in the proportion of correct answers on the
RAPM items, M = 0.58 for the HAM and M = 0.57 for
the LAM group, F < 1. Moreover, additional
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correlation analyses assessing the association
between the participant’s IQ and SCE magnitude
indices in this experiment also did not reveal any sig-
nificant effects. However, future studies should
include measures of executive functioning (next to
measures of general IQ) to explicitly assess potential
differences in cognitive control abilities that might
be associated with differences in achievement
motivation.
The present results are not in line with those
reported in a recent study (Feldman & Freitas,
2016). Feldman and Freitas used a Stroop task to
measure interference control and conflict adap-
tations in which they controlled for stimulus rep-
etition and stimulus-contingency confounds. Unlike
in our two experiments, in their study they did not
find significant associations between a measure of
conflict adaptation on one hand and a measure of
executive functioning and diverse self-report
measures of self-regulation on the other. The self-
reports also included the Grit Scale (Duckworth,
Peterson, Matthews, & Kelly, 2007), which measures
the tendency for perseverance for achieving long-
term goals, for which they only found a modest
and nonsignificant correlation with conflict adap-
tation (r = .12). However, although “grit” may be
related to the AMS, we would like to suggest that
the latter scale may be more directly linked to
affects associated with performing cognitive tasks.
Given the proposed interaction between affective
and motivational variables on one hand and SCEs
on the other, the AMS might be more sensitive to
show associations with SCEs than the Grit Scale.
However, clearly more research is needed to expli-
citly test these assumptions, by including other per-
sonality scales in future research.
Conclusion
The present experiments suggest that achievement
motivation is one of the factors that may modulate
the adaptation of cognitive control that is necessary
to deal with current environmental demands. Such
modulation may have implications for the interpret-
ation of the results of previous studies and the
design of future studies examining motivational
and emotional influences on cognitive control adap-
tations. A further implication of this modulation
could be that changing achievement motivation
by promoting more positive thoughts regarding
one’s ability to deal with cognitively demanding
tasks in general might also enhance the flexible
use of cognitive strategies for the purpose of
moment-to-moment adaptations to current cogni-
tive demands.
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